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Abstract 
Previous research indicates that explicit surveillance should 
induce subjects to attribute their performance at a task to the 
surveillance; hence, such subjects should persist to a lesser extent 
than subjects not exposed to such surveillance. Two forms of explicit 
surveillance were utilized: human and camera, as well as the appropriate 
opposites (humannon- and camera non-surveillance). Subjects were 
directed to perform a model construction task, then were unobtrusively 
observed during a post-task "waiting period". No difference in 
persistence was found for type of surveillance utilized. However, as 
predicted, subjects exposed to surveillance persisted less with the 
task materials than subjects not exposed.• 
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The exclamation: "I can't do this with you watching me.1" occurs 
frequently enough for almost everyone to be familiar with it. The usual 
result is for the observer to remove him/herself from the situation 
leaving the task-performer to continue happily on his way. Situations 
exist, however, in which role requirements constrain a person from 
expressing this feeling. For example, in industry it is expected that 
a supervisor has the right to observe the performance of a worker at 
any time; in penal or psychiatric institutions staff may observe the 
behaviour of inmates at any time; and in schools, teachers may assign 
tasks and then observe a student's performance. 
Historical Perspective 
The effect of an observer on one's performance at some task, 
although only recently begun to be studied within the framework of 
attribution theory, has its roots in the study of social facilitation. 
As early as the late nineteenth century, psychologists studied 
what is now called social facilitation. Typically a person's behaviour 
on a task while working alone was compared with his behaviour at the 
same task performed in the presence of others. Such studies often found 
that the performance of a subject at a task was enhanced (increased above 
a stabilized level) both in the presence of an audience and in coaction 
(i.e. with individuals engaged in the same task) (Allport, 1920; 
Travis, 1925; Triplett, 1897). However, Allport (1920) found that this 
paradigm did not apply to more complex tasks. Pessin (1933) demonstrated 
that although an audience enhanced the performance of a subject at a well 
learned task, the presence of an audience inhibited learning of new 
responses. Zajonc (1965) summarized previous studies of audience 
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effects and coaction (including various types of tasks and audiences). 
He concluded from the research that both coaction and the presence of 
an audience enhance performance of a well learned ("dominant") response 
and inhibit the learning of new responses. 
One direction that has apparently been overlooked by the social 
facilitation literature, is the long term effects of behaviour in the 
presence of others. That is, although social facilitation theory is 
able to make predictions concerning a particular subject's performance 
at a task (in the sense of whether a person will tend to perform the 
task on his own initiative) at some future time; Attribution theory 
provides a basis for making such predictions. 
Theoretical Considerations: Attribution Theory and Intrinsic Motivation 
Attribution theory generally encompasses the study of processes 
Individuals utilize in analyzing their own and others' behaviour, in an 
attempt to perceive the causes of behaviour (Bern 1965, 1967, 1972; Jones 
Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins and Weiner, 1971; Kelley 1967, 1973). 
Broadly speaking, attribution theory attempts to explain how behaviours 
are analysed in terms of factors originating in the environment, or 
externally; within the person, or internally; or a combination of both 
(Heider 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967, 1973). 
Before attribution theory was initially formulated by Harold 
Kelley In 1967, Koch (1956) noted that research in psychology tended to 
focus on all human motivation in terms of extrinsic factors. This, he 
postulated, failed to take into account much of human behaviour. He 
noted the need for a new "language"; that is, terms to explain intrinsic 
movitation. 
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Hunt (1965) posited a model intended to explain stages in the 
development of intrinsic.motivation. In stage one, at birth, infants 
supposedly respond with attentional orientation and arousal to changes 
In ongoing input through the ears and eyes: "Something heard becomes 
something to look at" (p. 258). In stage two, objects, persons and 
places which have become re cognitive ly familiar, become motivationally 
attractive, and this motivates efforts to retain or regain perceptual 
contact with the recognitively familiar: "Things should be recognizable" 
(p. 258). Finally, in stage three, there is an emergence of interest in 
what is novel in an otherwise recognitively familiar situation, focusing 
attention on new objects and places, and on manipulation of objects and 
exploration of places: "If you act you can make things happen" (p. 259). 
To summarize, Hunt (1970) explained that "by intrinsic motivation I mean 
that motivation which is inherent in information processing and action" 
(p. 1). Hunt developed this model within a very well referenced frame-
work of physiological and cognitive developmental studies. He did not 
however, expand on social factors which may affect intrinsic motivation. 
What is of significance is that an attempt was made to formulate a 
developmental model of internally generated behaviours. What was lacking, 
however, was the conceptualization of perhaps other stages or factors 
which would reveal some understanding of the dynamics of adult intrinsic 
motivation. 
At present this researcher has found no research extrapolating 
from Hunt's model. Some progress however, is being made from other 
directions (notably social psychology) toward defining some of the 
environmental and internal conditions affecting intrinsic motivation. 
Several theorists have attempted to explain the source and nature of 
intrinsic motivation in the human psychological make-up. 
From one line of thought relating to intrinsic motivation, 
Festinger (1954) postulated that "there exists in the human organism 
a drive to evaluate his opinions and abilities.... the holding of incorrect 
opinions and/or inaccurate appraisals of one's abilities can be punishing 
and often fatal in many situations" (p. 117). This suggests that a drive 
may exist for a person to seek causes for his own and others' behaviour. 
From another line of thought, DeCharms (1968) asserted that there 
is a tendency in man to "strive to be a causal agent.... to be the origin 
of his behaviour" (p. 269). Hence, DeCharms suggested there is a tendency 
for a person to seek to define his causal role in a situation which 
demands some performance from him. If a person perceives the locus of 
causality for his behaviour to be within himself (that is, sees himself 
as "actor" or "origin") he experiences intrinsic motivation, and finds the 
situation or activity rewarding in itself. If a person perceives the locus 
of causality for his behaviour to be external to himself (that is, sees 
himself as "pawn") he experiences extrinsic motivation. Having some 
extrinsic motivation implies that the person is involved in the activity 
for the sake of some extrinsic goal, such as a reward or an avoidance of 
punishment. 
Heider (1958) suggested that if a person works for the sake of 
some extrinsic goal, he may find the work itself "neutral or even dis-
agreeable" (p. 126). B.F. Skinner's (1953) theory of reinforcement would 
seem to suggest the opposite regarding an external goal which is positive; 
that is, if a person receives some positive reinforcement for eliciting 
a certain behaviour, he will have a positive attitude toward performing 
that behaviour. However, this is not necessarily so — the person may 
find the only positive or agreeable aspect of the behaviour is the 
expected reinforcement. In another sense, a person could "sacrifice" 
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a behaviour. That is, a person could perform a non-preferred behaviour 
rather than a preferred behaviour for the sake of reinforcement. 
Weiner (1972) noted that one quality that differentiates external 
from internal determinants of behaviour is that only sources of action 
attributed to the person (internal) can be labelled as "intentional". 
He goes on to suggest that "differential allocation of causality between 
the two factors also results in disparate affective experiences, future 
expectations and behaviours" (p. 315). 
Operational Definitions of Intrinsic Motivation 
At this point it is necessary to elaborate on what it is that 
researchers (in the area of attribution theory) refer to as intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. Nisbett and Valins (1973) point out that various 
researchers defined intrinsic-extrinsic motivation differently. For 
example, DeCharms (1968) refers to the internal as the causal role of the 
person, and the external as the causal role of the environment. Jones 
and Nisbett (1971) refer to a dispositional (intrinsic) versus situational 
(extrinsic) frame of reference. Dispositional characteristics are enduring 
personality traits of an individual, whereas situational characteristics 
are those which would generally elicit the same forces across different 
types of personalities to behave in a similar manner. Nisbett and Valins 
(1971) refer to factors intrinsic to a given stimulus versus those 
extrinsic or circumstantial. A person reacts to the functional aspects 
of a stimulus, assuming one is capable of "tunnel vision", or, on the 
other hand, one views that stimulus considering circumstances connected 
to that stimulus, a "wider lens vision" so to speak, giving weight to 
surrounding stimuli. For example, if a person is performing a task, with 
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few distractions present he is focusing on the factors intrinsic to the 
task, such as demands for performance from various parts of his body 
and mind. On the other hand, if the person is performing that same task 
with another person present who is evaluating his performance, the person 
tends to focus not only on factors intrinsic to the task but also the 
reactions (verbal comments, facial expressions) of the evaluating person. 
Kelley (1967, 1973) proposed a complex model of the factors which 
an individual takes into account before concluding whether he is 
intrinsically motivated toward performing some task or enjoys some 
stimulus or situation. The four vital criteria which Kelley proposed 
are involved in the judgment of a stimulus are: distinctiveness (the 
impression one has of a stimulus during the presence of the stimulus), 
consistency over time (the same or nearly the same impression occurring 
each time the stimulus is present), consistency over modality (a consistent 
reaction occurring even though the mode of interaction with the stimulus 
varies) and consensus (knowledge of other observer's or actors' consistent 
reaction to the stimulus). 
Theoretical Perspective of the Present Experiment 
Considering these various frames of reference, it seems that 
Nisbett and Valins' (1971) definition is most useful in terms of 
experimental testing of intrinsically motivated behaviour (as described 
later in this section). 
DeCharms' formulation does not adequately define factors which 
lead persons to conclude whether they are "origins" or "pawns". Aside 
from being simplistic, it would seem to imply an improbable view of 
individuals constantly striving to ascertain whether they or the world 
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is causing their reaction to the stimulus. 
Jones and Nisbett's frame of reference (situational versus 
dispositional) does account for an understanding of some information 
processing of social interactions in terms of the Actor-Observer studies. 
"Different aspects of available information are salient for actors and 
and observers, and this differential salience affects the course and 
outcome of the attribution process" (Jones and Nisbett, 1971, p. 85). 
Since the actor has much information about his own abilities, his perceived 
difficulty of the task, his self-confidence, his past successes and 
failures at the task, or in general at other tasks, and the observer has 
little information about the actor other than the perceived performance 
at the task, actor and observer obviously would process different 
attributions concerning the task-oriented behaviour. Observers tend 
to make dispositional attributions concerning an actor's behaviour, 
whereas actors tend to make situational attributions concerning their own 
behaviour (Jones and Harris 1967; Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and Ward, 
1968; Jones and Nisbett, 1971; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek, 1973; 
and Snyder and Jones 1974). Although these studies do not seek what 
attributions actors think observers are making, it seems reasonable that 
actors may intuitively understand the attribution process occurring within 
observers. Perceiving the inequity in the amount of task-relevant 
information available to observers and themselves, actors may find the 
presence of observers objectionable or aversive. These studies tend 
to confirm a probably very prevalent difference in attributions. However, 
little progress is made from this direction of research toward discover-
ing how an actor might come to make dispositional attributions concerning 
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his own behaviour. 
Kelley proposed what seems an acceptable model for explaining the 
attributional process. However, the complexity of that model does not 
readily lend itself to experimental confirmation. Manipulation and 
analysis of the relevant factors would heavily tax the resources of 
a researcher, as well as involve some considerable control over individual 
subjects. For example, confirmation of the model would perhaps involve 
the recording of some physiological measure (e.g. galvanic skin response 
or G.S.R.) for distinctiveness of impression of a stimulus. This measure 
would have to be recorded several times to ascertain whether the 
individual subject's reaction to the stimulus was consistent over time. 
This would have to be recorded with the stimulus presented in several 
modes: that is, the individual would have to interact with the stimulus 
in several different ways. Finally the individual would have to observe 
other individuals reacting (via G.S.R.) consistently in a certain fashion 
to the stimulus. After all this, the individual should form his judgment 
of the stimulus. The model is valuable to some researchers in that 
complex models often reflect more valid statements about human behaviour 
than simple models do. However, considering the disadvantages in 
utilizing the model (time required to test each subject, equipment, 
number of possible stimuli to choose from) the model seems impractical 
for experimental testing. 
The model of intrinsic-extrinsic motivation proposed by Nisbett 
and Valins (1971) seems most conducive to progressive research. Essentially 
the nature of the problem (concerning intrinsic motivation) through this 
model is: what are the important factors of circumstance which tend to 
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enable an individual (actor) to focus on a particular stimulus or task? 
Also, the problem (concerning extrinsic motivation) might be stated as: 
what are the important factors of circumstance which tend to result 
in an individual focusing on the stimulus plus the factors surrounding 
the stimulus? 
A possible answer to these questions may exist in statements from 
other attribution theorists. Bern (1965, 1967, 1972) and Kelley (1967, 
1973) suggested that individuals may, in the absence of an easily discern-
ible external basis for their behaviour, use their behaviour as evidence 
of some relatively stable internal characteristic. For example, when 
no salient external reward is present for performing a behaviour, 
individuals may conclude that the activity or situation is rewarding in 
itself. 
London and Nisbett (1974) have formulated a theory to extend this 
idea: 
The theory may be schematized in the following 
way: (1) an internal cue (2) arouses evaluative 
needs. The evaluative needs lead in turn to a 
(3) process of explanation in terms of (4) an 
external cue (p. 13). 
If an individual's behaviour in a situation arouses evaluative needs 
within that individual, and, if no external cues are readily available 
for purposes of explanation then the individual may assume that his 
behaviour originated from some "relatively stable internal characteristic". 
Research Related to the Present Experiment 
Deci (1972), Lepper and Greene (1975) and Lepper, Greene and 
Nisbett (1973) have demonstrated the consequences of salient external 
rewards. Deci found that college students who were paid to engage in an 
interesting activity showed a greater decrease in performance from the 
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first to the third engagements than unpaid controls. Lepper and Greene 
and Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, in similar experiments found that 
children who were promised a reward and rewarded for performing an 
interesting activity interacted significantly less with the target . 
activity during a normal classroom session some time later than did un-
expected reward and unrewarded controls. Thus, presence of rewards may 
be seen as one factor in the environment leading individuals to infer 
that their performance at a task was extrinsically motivated. This 
assumes, of course, that spontaneous manipulations of similar task 
materials at a future time indicates intrinsic motivation. 
There is some evidence that other factors may serve as cues for 
extrinsic motivation. Deci (1972) found that threatened punishment 
(for failure to solve interesting puzzles correctly) led to fewer 
spontaneous manipulations of similar materials when left alone (compared 
to unthreatened controls). 
Lepper and Greene (1975) demonstrated that surveillance may 
have the same undermining effect. Nursery school children were informed 
that they would be watched periodically through an obvious television 
camera while they performed a task of solving interesting puzzles. 
These children interacted significantly less with the target activity, 
later, in a normal classroom session, than did children who worked at the 
puzzles with the camera pointing away from them. Lepper and Greene 
manipulated high and low frequency of surveillance (surveillance during 
the solving of four of the six puzzles versus surveillance during the 
solving of one of the six puzzles) and found no difference. Subjects 
in both high and low surveillance conditions interacted less with the 
target activity than non-surveillance subjects. 
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These studies suggest that certain explicit extrinsic cues have 
an effect on persistence (future behaviour) at a task. Other studies 
indicate that-the salience of extrinsic cues may be lessened or the 
salience of internal cues increased with quite different effects. 
Valins (1966) found that male undergraduates believing a prerecorded 
sound track to be their own heart beat, tended strongly to prefer nude 
photographs shown in conjunction with a change in this bogus heart rate 
over others shown when the "heart rate" was "normal". Davidson and 
Valins (1969) demonstrated that behaviour change was more likely to be 
maintained if it was attributed to oneself than if it was attributed to 
a drug. Subjects withstood more electric shocks in a normal condition 
than when the attributed their lack of ability to a skin-sensitizer 
(actually a placebo) pill. Bowers (1975), via post-hypnotic suggestions, 
led subjects to self-attribute preferences for certain types of pictures 
in an art judgment task. The manipulated preference persisted during 
later test trials, even when the post-hypnotic suggestions were inoperative. 
Aside from the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic 
attributions in terms of future behaviour, Kruglanski, Friedman and Zeevi 
(1971) found differences in some qualitative aspects of task performance. 
Subjects in a no-incentive as opposed to promised reward condition 
exhibited superiority in creativity of performance and in task recall, 
manifested a stronger Ziegarnik effect (that is, a tendency to remember 
incompleted tasks) and reported greater enjoyment of the experiment. 
The above mentioned studies provide evidence that certain salient 
extrinsic (to the stimulus) cues may affect an individual's reaction to 
a stimulus task. The problem then arises in recognizing the presence 
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of an extrinsic cue affecting intrinsic motivation. Increased initial 
performance may not be sufficient evidence of the presence of an 
extrinsic cue affecting the behaviour: it is possible that intrinsic 
motivation may produce the same effect. Although qualitative aspects 
of task performance in conjunction with salient extrinsic (or lack of) 
cues may stand further examination, the measurement of such is still not 
sufficient to predict future behaviours. It seems that persistence at 
a task (spontaneous manipulation of the task materials) at a future time, 
in the absence of external compliance, is at present the only observable 
measure of an internally generated behaviour, or, an intrinsically 
motivated behaviour. 
If persistence at a task is to be a goal (in a social inter-
action introducing a task behaviour) it seems that extrinsic cues should 
be relatively subtle or non-salient. Examples of explicit extrinsic 
cues (in previous research) affecting persistence at a task include 
evidence of factors such as rewards, threats of punishment and surveillance. 
Appropriate control groups, which tended to persist to a greater extent 
at the tasks, were those subjected to the same procedure without the 
aforementioned explicit extrinsic cues present. 
Experiments testing effects of these explicit extrinsic cues tended 
to involve only one observation of persistence. Concerning the effect-
iveness of a single interaction, Kelley and Thibaut (1971) have suggested 
that a brief sample of behaviour may serve chiefly to introduce attribut-
ional instability and consequent information seeking. Perhaps the 
"consequent information seeking" may involve performance at the task at 
a future time, if such an opportunity should exist. The tendency to 
persist at the task at a future time may be explained in these terms, and 
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the future opportunity may as easily disconfirm as confirm the person's 
attribution. 
Valins (1974), however, suggested that consequences of this future 
information-seeking behaviour may tend to be biased in the direction of 
the attribution made during the previous, subtly-generated behaviour. 
In Valins' (1974) experiment, male undergraduates, even after being 
informed that the heart rate that led them to prefer certain photographs 
over others was really a bogus heart rate, still expressed preference for 
those photographs over others. 
Rajala and Ross (1973) tested the hypothesis that surveillance 
affects persistence, as did the Lepper and Greene (1973) study; however 
the two methodologies differed. Lepper and Greene utilized both sexes of 
nursery school children as subjects, a television camera as a surveillance 
technique, did not attempt to control for performance (in terms of time), 
and conducted the post-experimental persistence measure two weeks later. 
Rajala and Ross utilized male undergraduates as subjects and the physical 
presence or absence of the experimenter as a surveillance technique. 
They attempted to control for performance, and obtained the persistence 
measure through immediate post-task unobtrusive observation. Both 
experiments yielded significant results; that is, subjects in the 
surveillance condition tended to persist less at the target task behaviour 
than subjects in the non-surveillance condition. However, the Rajala and 
Ross study yielded a substantial number of zero persistence scores for 
both experimental and control groups, which precluded the possibility of 
utilizing a parametric test of the results. 
Although the Rajala and Ross experiment yielded significant 
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results in terms of a one tailed, non-parametric test, its results were 
questionable. The result's of the Lepper and Greene study were also 
questionable, this experimenter felt, in terms of whether nursery 
school children were able to understand the significance of the television 
camera. Perhaps the television camera meant something entirely different 
to the children than the surveillance it was intended to represent. The 
Lepper and Greene experiment also presented problems in terms of control 
of extraneous factors. During the post-task persistence measure, 
conducted unobtrusively in a normal classroom setting, many children 
were present and some of these may have interacted with the task materials 
for an inordinate amount of time. Hence, some of the children placed 
under surveillance in the experiment may not have had sufficient 
opportunity to interact with the puzzles during the normal classroom 
session. Since the results of both previous surveillance studies were 
questionable, the present study was conducted, to provide a more direct 
and meaningful test of the relationship between surveillance and persist-
ence at a task. 
The Present Experiment 
This study constituted a further attempt to ascertain the 
the effects of surveillance on intrinsic motivation as measured by 
persistence at a task with an adult population. The main hypothesis of 
this experiment was that subjects placed under surveillance during the 
task time will persist to a lesser extent during a post task free-time 
period than subjects not placed under surveillance during the task time. 
The presence of surveillance, as attribution theory suggests, should 
15 
lead subjects to attribute their performance at the task at least to some 
extent to the presence of the surveillance. Hence, once the surveillance 
is removed, the subjects under surveillance should continue to interact 
with the task materials to a lesser extent than subjects who had not been 
under surveillance. 
Of further interest, this experiment compared human surveillance 
and camera surveillance. This was done to elicit any possible differences 
between the two types of surveillance, since both types of surveillance 
are present to some extent in previously mentioned constraining 
situations (e.g. industrial settings). Also, previous research has 
included both human and camera surveillance but apparently no one has 
compared the two in one study. Although it is not possible to make an 
explicit hypothesis with respect to human versus camera surveillance 
differences, one might expect human surveillance to have a greater impact. 
That is, subjects under human surveillance should persist less than 
subjects under camera surveillance. One might speculate that human 
surveillance is more salient since subjects can readily confirm that 
they are being observed and can verbally interact with the observer. 
With camera surveillance, subjects cannot readily confirm that they are 
being observed. That is, it is not possible to verbally interact with 
the observer and it is possible that the observer may periodically be 
engaged at other tasks. 
For the purpose of this experiment persistence is defined as 
spontaneous interaction with the task materials (tinker toys) in the 
absence of external constraints such as expectations, role requirements, 
etc. The interaction as such, covered a wide variety of manners in which 
the task material might be 'interacted with. For example, a subject might 
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touch only one or two pieces, manipulating them in various ways, obviously 
not constructing a model as a work unit (as defined during the perform-
ance trial). A subject might even have constructed a model then dis-
assembled it, all this time being counted as interaction with the task 
materials. 
The construction of tinker toy models was chosen as the task for 
this experiment, because the experimenter felt that this task had certain 
advantages. First, tinker toys constitute a relatively novel task 
material, not likely to have entered the particular subject group's 
repertoire of behaviour for some considerable length of time, e.g. 10-15 
years, since childhood. Hence this would eliminate differences in 
2 
performance due to differential practice effects. Secondly, the task 
material is relatively simple to manipulate. That is, it is expected 
that few people would have trouble constructing models. Thirdly, with 
this task, performance may be measured, both in number of models construct-
ed and total number of pieces used in the models. 
Since Henchy and Glass (1968) found that "threat of evaluation in 
the absence of an audience can produce energizing effects upon performance 
about identical to those obtained when experts are observing the 
individual" (p. 452), an attempt was made, in this experiment, to control 
for performance through the emphasis that the individual subject's 
performance would be scored afterward. Hopefully, this would have 
produced "energizing effects" on the performance of subjects in the non-
surveillance conditions to counteract effects of social facilitation on 
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performance in the surveillance condition. Thus, regardless of 
condition, subjects believed that their performance was to be evaluated. 
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A post-task questionnaire (Appendix B) attempted to elicit 
qualitative differences in task performance, as perceived by the 
subjects. 
An attempt was also made via post-experimental questioning 
(Appendix D) to ascertain the subject's awareness of the surveillance 
or lack of it, and to determine what subjective effects each particular 
condition produced. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects who volunteered to participate in the experiment were 
sixty-eight single male undergraduates, enrolled in the introductory 
psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University. Experimental participat-
ion is encouraged but not required for introductory psychology students 
at W.L.U. 
Procedure 
Seventeen subjects were randomly assigned to each of four 
conditions: 
1. human surveillance present 
2. human surveillance absent 
3. television camera present, operative, directed at task area 
4. television camera present, inoperative, directed away from 
task area. 
As each subject entered the experiment room (see Appendix A for 
experimental setting), the experimenter directed him to be seated in a 
chair before the table. On the table there were a shallow box full of 
tinker toy pieces (approximately four hundred pieces) and a list of 
models to build. On a stand beside the table there was a large, empty 
box. The experimenter sat in a chair to one side of the table and 
instructed each subject as follows: 
"What I want you to do is to simply build some models. 
This is a timed task; you will have twenty minutes to work 
on it, and afterwards I have a questionnaire I'd like 
you to fill out. I'm interested in finding out how many 
models you can build in the time allotted, as well as 
how well they approximate the object. This may be 
seen as sort of a trade off between quantity and 
quality. I want you to start at the top of this list 
of models and work your way down, building each one as 
it comes up. I want you to build whatever you think 
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each one looks like; they can be either two or three 
dimensional. Don't skip any one if you think it's 
too hard; just make something that looks like it. 
As you finish each model, I want you to put it in 
the box over here (indicating large, empty box), 
because I've got to take the models out to score 
them after the time is up. You've got twenty 
minutes to work at this, but you don't have to 
finish all the models within this time. Just do 
what you can. I'll let you know when the time is 
up. Do you have any questions?....Okay, you can 
start now." 
For human surveillance subjects (HS), the experimenter, after 
instructing the subject to start, sat back, noticeably activating a 
stopwatch. The experimenter watched the subject building each model 
(apparently timing each model constructed) and made copious notes on 
his clip board. The experimenter briefly answered any questions asked 
by the subject. 
For human non-surveillance subjects (HNS), the experimenter rose after the 
instructions, commenting: "I'll leave you to work at this and I'll let 
you know when the time is up'." Then, after noticeably activating a stop-
watch, he left the room. 
For camera surveillance subjects (CS), the experimenter commented: 
"I would like to observe your progress at,the task by means of this 
camera". Then, after plugging in the camera to activate it (actually a 
dummy camera with an obtrusive red light activated when the camera was 
plugged in), the experimenter left the room. 
For camera non-surveillance subjects (CNS), (that is, the television 
camera was present in the room, but not activated, and was pointed toward 
a wall away from the subject) the experimenter proceeded similarly as for 
the human non-surveillance condition, making no mention of the camera's 
presence. 
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For all conditions, after the twenty minutes of task time, 
the experimenter re-entered the room (or rose, in the human surveillance 
condition), and commented: "Okay, time is up". If the subject was in 
the process of building a model, the experimenter instructed him to put 
what was done of it in the box with the rest of the models. 
The experimenter then picked up the box of models built, 
explaining: "I have to take these out to be scored and you may wait 
here. It will only take a few minutes, then I have a questionnaire I'd 
like you to fill out." The experimenter then left the room, taking 
the box of models and list, and proceeded to the observation room. 
Before leaving, in the camera surveillance condition, the experimenter 
casually unplugged the camera, commenting: "I won't need this any more". 
Approximately one half minute later the experimenter began record-
ing the subject's persistence time (using two stop watches). The 
observation of persistence time was unobtrusive, by means of a real 
television camera disguised behind an intercom speaker screen in the 
ceiling of the experiment room and focused on the table with the tinker 
toy pieces on it. The picture of activity on the table was projected to 
a television monitor in the adjacent (observation) room. The persistence 
time measure consisted of the time spent touching tinker toy pieces within 
the ten minutes immediately following the experimenter taking position 
for observation. 
After recording the persistence time, the experimenter returned 
to the experiment room bringing the box of models and a copy of the 
questionnaire. The experimenter commented: "Here is a questionnaire 
I'd like you to fill out". 
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The questionnaire (see Appendix B) contained four evaluative 
questions and one filler question. The evaluative questions concerned 
forced choice ratings of task interest, enjoyableness and difficulty, 
and a rating of subject nervousness during the experiment. The filler 
question (#3, given simply to balance the page) concerned rating of the 
task on several irrelevant dimensions; for example, good to bad. 
The experimenter then left the room commenting: "I'll leave you 
with that for a few minutes". One minute after the subject completed 
the questionnaire (observed by means of the television monitor) the 
experimenter returned. 
The experimenter then asked the subject questions to determine 
what the subject thought the experiment was about (see Appendix D). 
Following this, the experimenter probed subjects with questions concerning 
their awareness of their experimental condition, how it made them feel 
toward the task and what effect they thought their condition had upon 
their performance at the task (see Appendix E for the responses). The 
experimenter then debriefed each subject as to the real purpose of the 
experiment, the deception used (as well as why it was necessary), and 
revealed the observation room and its contents (see Appendix G). 
Finally, the experimenter asked subjects not to reveal anything 
of the experiment or experimental setting to anyone, explaining that he 
would be running more subjects and that naive subjects were needed for 
valid results. The experimenter thanked each subject for taking part in 
the experiment and promised feedback when the experiment was finished. 
After each subject left, the experimenter counted the number of 
models (unfinished models were counted as whole models), the total number 
of pieces used and disassembled the models. 
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Results 
Task Performance 
A 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance for number of models 
constructed (see Table 1 for means, Table 2 for analysis of variance) 
indicated no significant difference between presence or absence of 
surveillance. Type of surveillance (human versus camera) did not 
significantly affect number of models constructed, nor was there a 
significant interaction effect. 
A 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance for number of pieces used 
in construction of the models (see Table 3 for means, Table 4 for analysis 
of variance) also indicated no significant difference between presence 
or absence of surveillance. Type of surveillance (human versus camera) 
approached significance, F (1,67) = 3.55 £ /. 06. That is, subjects in 
the human surveillance and human non-surveillance conditions tended to 
use more pieces than subjects in their camera counterparts (X (human) 
= 120.89 pieces, X (camera) «* 106.44 pieces). The interaction effect 
was not significant. 
Persistence 
A further 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance with persistence 
times (see Table 5 for means, Table 6 for analysis of variance) indicated 
a significant main effect for presence or absence of surveillance, 
F (1.67) = 12.12 £^.001. Subjects who had been under surveillance 
persisted less (X » 2.77 minutes) than subjects who had not been under 
surveillance (X « 5.42 minutes). Type of surveillance however, was not 
significantly different, nor was there a significant interaction effect. 
/ 
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TABLE 1 
Mean Number of Models Constructed 
Surveillance 
Non-Surveillance 
Overall X 
Human 
13.00 
10.35 
11.68 
Camera 
10.65 
10.59 
10.62 
Overall X 
11.83 
10.47 
11.15 
Note. Maximum number possible = 20. 
Number of subjects in each cell = 17. 
TABLE 2 
Analysis of Variance: 
Number of Models 
Source of Variation 
Surv 
a 
TSurv. 
Surv x TSurv 
Residual 
Total 
a Surv = presence vs. absence of surveillance 
b TSurv - human vs. camera surveillance 
Sum of Squares 
31.118 
19.059 
28.471 
727.876 
808.523 
D.F. 
1 
1 
1 
64 
67 
Mean Square 
31.118 
19.059 
28.471 
12.038 
2 
1 
2 
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TABLE 3 
Mean Number of Pieces Used 
Surveillance 
Non-Surveillance 
Overall X 
Human 
129.24 
112.53 
120.89 
Camera 
107.41 
105.47 
106.44 
Overall X 
118.33 
109.00 
113.88 
/ 
TABLE 4 
Analysis of Variance: 
Number of Pieces 
Source of Variation 
Surv 
a 
TSurv. 
D 
Surv x TSurv 
Residual 
Total 
a Surv • presence vs. absence of surveillance 
b TSurv « human vs. camera surveillance 
Sum of Squares D.F. 
1477.779 
3545.309 
926.484 
63839.426 
69789.000 
. . 
1 
1 
1 
64 
67 
Mean Square 
1477.779 
3545.309 
926.484 
997.491 
1041.627 
1 
3 
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TABLE 5 
Mean Persistence Times 
Surveillance 
Non-Surveillance 
Overall X 
Note. Maximum time • 
(Minutes) 
Human Camera Overall X 
2.52 3.02 2.77 
5.39 5.44 5.42 
3.96 4.23 4.09 
.0 minutes 
TABLE 6 
An< 
Source of Variat ion 
Surv 
a 
TSurv. 
Surv x TSurv 
Residual 
Total 
i l y s i s of Variance: 
Pers i s tence 
Sum of Squares 
118.880 
1.291 
.838 
628.029 
749.039 
D.F. 
1 
1 
1 
64 
67 
Mean Sqi 
118.880 
1.291 
.838 
9.813 
11.180 
12 
a Surv - presence vs. absence of surveillance 
b TSurv « human vs. camera surveillance 
*£ ^.001 
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To elicit any correlation between performance and persistence, 
the factors of number of models, number of pieces used and persistence 
time were correlated by means of Pearson correlation coefficients. 
These calculations were based on all of the data, disregarding 
experimental conditions. A significant correlation was found between 
number of models built and number of pieces used (r = .63, n /.001). 
Number of pieces and persistence failed to relate significantly (r =-:18); 
however, number of models and persistence related significantly in a 
negative direction (r =—22, p ^ .05). 
Since a significant negative correlation was found between a 
number of models built and persistence scores, the possibility arose that 
a>third factor may have interfered with the persistence behaviour of 
subjects. For example, possibly subjects were fatigued after building 
many models and therefore didn't persist as much as those who built fewer 
models. On the other hand subjects may have been frustrated because they 
couldn't complete as many models as they wished to, and therefore persist-
ed more than those who had built more models. Thus an analysis of 
covariance was performed on persistence scores to control for number of 
models built. This analysis confirmed the significance of the main 
effect for surveillance F (1,67) = 10.07, £ (.005 (see Table 7 for the 
Analysis of Covariance and Table 8 for the adjusted means). 
Questionnaire Responses 
The scores on each of the four variables within the questionnaire 
were collapsed into two groupings for purposes of analysis. All of the 
positive directed scores were placed in one category, and all of the 
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TABLE 7 
Analysis of Covariance 
of Persistence Times 
Adjusted for Number of Models Constructed 
Source of Variation 
Surv 
a 
TSurv, 
D 
Surv x TSurv 
Residual 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
98.232 
15.340 
.027 
614.718 
728.317 
D.F. 
1 
1 
1 
64 
67 
Mean Square 
98.232 
15.340 
.027 
9.757 
18.704 
F 
10.07* 
1.572 
.003 
a Surv • presence vs. absence of surveillance 
b TSurv » human vs. camera surveillance 
*£^.005 
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TABLE 8 
Adjusted Means : 
Persistence Times and Models Built 
Surv 
a 
11.824 
2.769 
2.864 
NonSurv, 
D 
10.471 
5.413 
5.495 
Mean 
c 
11.1475 
4.091 
4.180 
a Surv = human and camera surveillance 
b NonSurv = human non- and camera non-surveillance 
c Mean = grand mean 
d X = mean number of models 
e Y • mean persistence times (minutes) 
f Y'» adjusted mean persistence times 
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negative directed scores were treated as the other category. A Chi 
square one way analysis of variance for k independent samples 
(Siegel, 1956) was applied to the four groups of scores for each of 
the variables. No significant differences were found for any of the 
variables (see Table 9). 
While this analysis (Chi square) is appropriate for the data 
at hand, it wasted a good deal of information (i.e. by collapsing six 
categories into two). Thus analyses of variance were carried out on 
the original responses to each question by assigning numbers (one through 
six) to the response categories. Only one significant effect was found. 
Subjects under surveillance rated themselves as being more nervous than 
subjects not exposed to surveillance, F (1,67) = 4.75, p^.05. 
Raw scores on the questionnaire items were then correlated for 
all subjects, regardless of experimental conditions, with performance 
and persistence scores, by means of a Spearman correlation coefficient 
(Siegel, 1956). None of the questionnaire item responses related 
significantly with the main measures of performance and persistence. 
Probe Responses 
In addition to the major measures of this experiment, each subject 
was, before being debriefed, asked what effect his particular condition 
had on his performance at the task. Responses to the question (see 
Appendix E for actual responses) were categorized in terms of positive 
(e.g. better, faster, more), negative (e.g. bothered, nervous, did less) 
or no effect (e.g. no effect, not bothered, no thought) (see Table 10). 
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TABLE 9 
Number of Subjects in Each Condition Rating Items 
in a Positive Direction 
HS HNS. CS CNS Total/68 
Interest 
Enjoyable 
Difficulty 
Nervous. 
11 
14 
5 
7 
14 
13 
6 
12 
15 
12 
5 
8 
12 
11 
9 
12 
52 
50 
25 
39 
Note. Maximum score = 17 (i.e. n 17 in each 
condition) 
a Human surveillance 
b Human non-surveillance 
c Camera surveillance 
d Camera non-surveillance 
e Scores reflecting "easy" 
f Scores reflecting "calm" 
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TABLE 10 
Responses Concerning Effect of Condition 
on Performance at the Task 
Human surveillance 
Human non-surveillance 
Camera surveillance 
Camera non-surveillance 
No Effect 
6 
5 
12 
13 
Positive 
6 
12 
2
 V 
3 
Negative 
5 
0 
3 
1 
; 
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Discussion 
As hypothesized, subjects exposed to surveillance during the 
task time interacted significantly less with the task materials when 
surveillance was removed than subjects not under surveillance initially. 
It seemed to make no difference whether the surveillance was in the 
form of human or camera surveillance. Other explanations such as 
fatigue, satiation, etc., were not supported since there were no 
significant differences in performance of the groups, either in number 
of models built or number of pieces of material used. 
Evidence that a fatigue or satiation effect could be possible 
within the constraints of the experimental situation existed from the 
significant negative correlation between number of models built and 
time spent persisting with the task materials. That is, the greater the 
number of models an individual built, the less time he tended to persist in 
interacting with the task materials. This led to the possibility that 
some other factor may have served as an explanation for the different 
persistence times. Subjects who built more models may have felt satiated 
and thus they may have persisted less. Conversely, subjects who built 
fewer models may have felt frustrated or incomplete, hence they may 
have persisted more. These other possible explanations were not support-
ed. The analysis of covariance of persistence times adjusted for number 
of models built confirmed the significance of the surveillance effect. 
From the analysis of the questionnaire data it seemed that 
subjects in all conditions perceived the task similarly in terms of 
interest, enjoyableness and difficulty. However, from the analysis of 
variance of nervousness scores it seemed that surveillance made those 
subjects more nervous, hence they apparently had a greater need to 
relax. It is noteworthy that this possible greater need to relax 
involved significantly less interaction with the task material. One 
might speculate that this need for relaxation might just as well have 
been satisfied by further interaction with the task materials. At this 
point It is apparent that further research is needed to clarify the 
relation between surveillance and nervousness, as well as how they 
affect persistence at task oriented behaviour. 
As reported, all subjects were asked whether their particular 
condition (presence or absence of surveillance) had any effect on their 
performance at the task. The data (Appendix E) seems to indicate that 
surveillance does not produce an overwhelming negative effect. In fact 
over half of all subjects (36/68) indicated surveillance or lack of it 
made no difference on their performance. A substantial number reported 
positive effects (23/68), while a relatively small number of subjects 
reported negative effects (9/68). This suggests several possibilities: 
surveillance or lack of surveillance makes no subjective difference to 
a task performer, the subject population was not accustomed to thinking 
about questioning the presence or absence of surveillance, or the 
questions asked may have been unsuccessful in producing candid responses. 
Although attribution theory was useful in generating this 
research, it seems that no one direction of attribution theory entirely 
explains the phenomenon. For example, the difference in persistence 
times of the surveillance and non-surveillance groups seems to be 
predicted from the theories of Bern (1965, 1967, 1973), Kelley (1967, 
1973) and London and Nisbett (1974). If a subject's behaviour at 
the task aroused evaluative needs, the subject may have sought an 
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explanation for that behaviour in terms of external cues. For subjects 
in the surveillance conditions, an external cue was readily available 
in the form of the surveillance. Hence they may have concluded that 
their behaviour at the task was a result of the surveillance and that 
they had relatively little internal disposition toward performing the 
particular task. For subjects in the non-surveillance conditions, an 
external cue was not readily available. None of the typical external 
cues serving to motivate behaviour, such as rewards or threats of 
punishment, were obvious in the situation. Hence non-surveillance 
subjects may have concluded that their performance at the task was a 
result of some relatively stable internal disposition. This conclusion 
may have led in turn to further interaction with the task materials. 
Although such an explanation seems quite plausible, the 
difference in persistence times may also be explained in terms of Jones 
and Nisbett's (1971) theory. As they suggested, there Is an inequality 
in the amount of task-relevant information available to an actor as 
opposed to an observer. That is, all subjects had much information 
concerning their own abilities, their perceived difficulty of the task, 
their past successes and failures at the task and, in general, at 
other tasks. The experimenter, whom subjects may have presumed to be 
evaluating their performance (and possibly them as persons), obviously 
had little of that information. It is possible that subjects may have 
resented this evaluation in terms of some unknown standard without the 
taking into account of the information that was salient to them. 
Since the salience of evaluation was greater for subjects in 
the surveillance conditions (a glance would serve to remind them) those 
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subjects may have resented the evaluation to a greater degree. Some of 
this resentment may have been transferred subsequently to the task. 
Hence subjects under surveillance persisted less with the task materials 
than subjects not under surveillance. 
Other theories outside of the context of attribution theories 
also seem to account for the phenomenon. Festinger (1957) stated that 
cognitive dissonance may result from"... engaging in an act discrepant 
with prior attitudes...'' (p. 261). All subjects may have to some extent 
felt that performing at the particular task (tinker toys) was incongruent 
with prior attitudes toward the task. Surveillance may have justified 
the incongruity of performance at the task for those subjects. 
Hence, once the surveillance was removed, those subjects may have con-
tinued to perform in a manner congruent with their prior attitude which 
manifested itself in relatively lesser interaction with the task 
materials. With the salient incongruency of performing at the task 
uncoupled with any salient justification, subjects in the non-surveillance 
conditions could have attempted to reduce their dissonance afterwards. 
They may have done this through greater continued interaction with 
the task materials to convince themselves that they really liked to 
perform at the task. 
A cognitive dissonance viewpoint is not entirely viable however. 
The auspices of scientific investigation may have lent seriousness and 
credibility to performance at the task. Also, subjects may have 
presumed that other subjects performed at the task hence it was accept-
able to do so. For these reasons any effect of prior attitudes may have 
been discounted. Nevertheless, since subjects were not questioned 
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concerning prior attitudes toward the task, it is not known whether 
performance at the task induced any cognitive dissonance. 
Finally an explanation of the phenomenon may exist in terms of 
the demand characteristics of the experimental situation. Demand 
characteristics may be defined as those cues which convey the experimental 
hypothesis to the subject. As Orne (1962) suggested, subjects can be 
expected to 'behave in an experimental context in a manner designed 
to play the role of a "good subject", or in other words, to validate 
the experimental hypothesis' (p. 778). If such cues were present, 
subjects in the surveillance conditions may have perceived that they should 
not continue to interact with the task materials, and acted accordingly. 
Also, subjects in the non-surveillance conditions may have perceived 
that they were expected to continue to interact with the task materials 
and acted accordingly. This explanation is not plausible however, since 
all subjects were given the same instructions concerning the task, and 
subjected to the same procedure differing only in presence or absence 
of surveillance. Furthermore, during the post experimental questioning, 
none of the subjects indicated any idea of the real purpose of the 
experiment, making it unlikely that demand characteristics accounted 
for the difference in persistence times. 
Clearly, the connection between a student subject manipulating 
a few tinker toy pieces and, for example, an industrial worker perform-
ing work units involves a considerable inferential leap. However, there 
are similarities in both situations which may help narrow the gap. 
Both this experimental situation and industrial settings involve 
constraints which limit the amount of other potentially more attractive 
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pursuits for behaviour. In fact, since the work materials are the 
only manipulable objects present, the choices for the subject or 
worker are to (a) not manipulate the work materials or (b) manipulate 
the work materials to a greater or lesser extent. 
This experiment involved only one trial observation of persist-
ence behaviour. However, an industrial worker may often find himself 
involved in a similar situation (in which his activities are confined 
to the work materials) where there are no obvious external constraints. 
Obviously important information to him regarding what he should do is 
what he did the first time. If a worker manipulates the work materials 
to a great extent during the first time that he is free from external 
control, then he may self-attribute a preference for interacting in 
that manner toward his environment. 
The situational constraints of this experiment and of industrial 
settings are similar, differing perhaps in expectation of what should be 
done during the period of unconstrained activity. Subjects in this 
experiment did not expect to have to continue constructing models whereas 
workers are expected to continue completing work units. Since presence 
or absence of surveillance made a significant difference in the tendencies 
of subjects to continue to interact with the task materials, perhaps 
presence or absence of surveillance would make a difference in the 
tendencies of workers to continue completing work units during un-
constrained times. Further research is needed to determine whether 
this is indeed the case within the context of an Industrial setting. 
It must be emphasized that this experiment represents a single 
measure of a surveillant-surveillee interaction, with only one particular 
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type of surveillance. Existent patterns of surveillance which may 
differ considerably on several dimensions might produce different 
effects. For example the characteristics of the surveillant may be 
radically different. A relatively silent non-interactive type of 
surveillance such as this experiment represented may produce radically 
different results in terms of persistence than a warm, open, coequal 
type of surveillance. Also, longer term interactions between surveillant 
and surveillee may provide quite different effects. Possibly the 
reaction of a person to surveillance in terms of persistence may be 
ameliorated over a lengthy period of such interactions. Further 
research might pursue what kinds of Variables strengthen, weaken or 
even reverse the surveillance phenomenon. 
Of concern is the basic inherent nature of the task. In this 
case the social facilitation phenomenon may be of interest in further 
research. For example, interesting tasks may be complex and relatively 
novel in nature, in which case surveillance may hinder performance as 
well as persistence. On the other hand, uninteresting tasks may be 
simple in nature in which case surveillance may be useful in facilitat-
ing increased performance. High frequency of surveillance may be 
necessary in the case of an uninteresting task, to ensure continued 
performance. 
Strickland (1958) and later Kruglanski (1970) and Kipnis (1972) 
found evidence that the more a supervisor initially monitored the 
performance of a worker, the less he tended to trust the continued 
output of that worker in the absence of his supervision. Such 
supervisors also chose to monitor such workers more frequently in 
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later performance trials than workers whom they had initially not 
monitored as frequently. Lepper and Greene (1975) noted that: 
Such self-fulfilling cycles, like 'superstitious' 
behavior, are not likely to be discovered by the 
participants, who have no reason to be skeptical 
of the necessity of a system of overt extrinsic 
controls; indeed the mere existence of such 
controls bears testimony to their necessity (p. 485). 
The results of the present study suggest that surveillance may 
be a significant tool in the manipulation of behaviour. Simply, if one 
wishes to undermine another's persistence at a task (providing the task 
is inherently interesting and one has the institutional powers to so 
observe), all one has to do is explicitly and frequently watch that 
person performing the behaviour, then remove the surveillance. On the 
other hand, if one wishes to foster intrinsically motivated behaviour, as 
indicated by a greater continued interaction with task materials during 
unconstrained times, it may be best to simply introduce the task 
behaviour and leave the task performer alone. In therapeutic situations 
it may be well to combine surveillance of asocial behaviour with more 
subtle suggestions (and lack of explicit surveillance) concerning other 
forms of more socially acceptable behaviour. In industrial settings 
it may be of value to utilize less surveillance of employee production. 
Finally, in classrooms, especially at the primary and secondary levels 
where teacher presence is almost total during the normal day, it may 
be beneficial to develop situations in which the teacher removes his/her 
surveillance while pupils are busily engaged at some pre-determined 
learning or practice task. 
Obviously these are oversimplified recommendations and based on 
little data. Further research is needed concerning many aspects of the 
surveillance phenomenon. For example, research might pursue what the 
optimal level of surveillance (i.e. Observer-Actor interaction frequency) 
is in order to obtain "persistence" effects. Another direction of 
interest is whether existing patterns of surveillance can be changed and 
whether a decrease in frequency of surveillance would enhance persistence 
at tasks. If this is possible, it would be beneficial to both actor and 
observer in reducing the onus of surveillance from both. 
If, as Kipnis (1972) has proposed, the mere availability of 
institutional powers is virtually sufficient to ensure their use, Lepper 
and Greene (1975) speculate that it would not be surprising to find a 
prevalence of such self-perpetuating cycles of surveillance-distrust-
surveillance in our society. Further research into the existent 
systems of surveillance (therapeutic, industrial, academic and others) 
may prove that such surveillance may be a phenomenon that occurs to a 
very limited extent. Indeed, surveillance in terms of the presence of 
one who is more versed in aspects of performance of a task and thus able 
to help a task performer is necessary and desirable at times. However, 
further research within the existing systems of surveillance may also 
provide clues to the solution of social problems such as ineffective 
therapy, job dissatisfaction and high employee turnover rates, as 
well as possibly academic failure and high dropout rates. 
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Footnotes 
Traditionally a one tailed test is used only when previous 
research indicates the direction of an effect. Since no previous 
research existed concerning effects of surveillance on persistence, 
the significance of the one tailed test (where the use of a two tailed 
test was not significant) might indicate spurious results. 
2 
This was confirmed in the post-experimental interview such that 
none of the subjects indicated any recent experience with the task 
materials. 
3 
Social facilitation literature suggested that individuals 
performing at a simple task, while in the presence of others, would 
perform to a greater extent than individuals performing that task while 
working alone. If this had resulted within the present experiment, 
other explanations for different persistence times would have been 
possible. For example, individuals in surveillance groups could possibly 
have persisted less because they were more fatigued or satiated than 
individuals in non-surveillance groups. 
4 
The general procedure was adopted from the procedure developed 
for the Rajala and Ross (1973) study. The task and persistence measure 
times (20 minutes and 10 minutes respectively) were chosen to best suit 
the typical "one hour experiment". This left sufficient time to 
introduce the subject to the task, as well as to conduct the post-
experimental questioning and debriefing. The number of models (20) on 
the list was found to be sufficiently large such that subjects were 
highly unlikely to construct all the models within the task time. The 
number was also small enough such that subjects would feel that there 
existed a possibility of completing all of the models within the task 
time. 
The experimenter representing human surveillance was a male 
graduate student of pleasant appearance, approximately of the same age 
group as the subject population. 
Concerning the effectiveness of the camera as a surveillance 
technique with the subject population, informal feedback suggested that 
subjects in the camera surveillance condition were convinced that the 
camera was real and that they believed they were being watched during 
the task time. 
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APPENDIX A 
Se t t ing 
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T1 
H 
C\»«'/'x 
i p 
EI ~~ m 
<r 
0 m 
A Experimenter chair 
B Television camera (dummy) 
C Box of tinker toy pieces 
D Table 
E List of models 
F Subject chair 
G Large empty box 
H Stand for empty box 
I Observation position 
J Television monitor 
K Television camera, above work area of the table, concealed 
behind intercom speaker screen 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Questionnaire 
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Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by placing an X in the appropriate 
rating: for example, ( X ). 
somewhat interest-
ing 
1. How interesting did you find the mechanical task? 
i. i_ ± ± ± 
very unin- somewhat slightly slightly somewhat very 
teresting uninterest- uninterest- interest- inter- interest-
ing ing ing esting ing 
How enjoyable did you find the mechanical task? 
/ L L L L 
very somewhat slightly slightly somewhat very 
enjoyable enjoyable enjoyable unenjoy- unenjoy- unenjoy-
able able able 
3. Evaluate the mechanical task on the following dimensions: 
meaningful y 
unimportant / 
useful i 
good / 
inferior / 
' / i 
' 1 J 
' 1 > 
t / i 
' 1 1 
' 1 
' 1 
' 1 
f
 1 
' ' 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
meaningless 
important 
useless 
bad 
superior 
4. How difficult was the task? 
± JL ±- JL 
very somewhat slightly slightly somewhat very 
difficult difficult difficult easy easy easy 
5. How nervous were you during the experiment? 
JL ± ± JL very somewhat slightly slightly somewhat very 
calm calm calm nervous nervous nervous 
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APPENDIX C 
Raw Data 
54 
Data Abbreviation Code 
H.S. human surveillance 
H.N.S. human non-surveillance 
C.S. camera surveillance 
C.N.S. camera non-surveillance 
MOD number of models 
PCS number of pieces 
PERSIS persistence/10 minutes 
INT interest 
ENJ enjoyableness 
DIFF difficulty 
NERV nervousness 
MEAN meaningfulness 
IMP importance 
USE usefulness 
GOOD goodness 
SUPERIOR superiority 
+ indicates positive, e.g. +3: very interesting 
indicates negative, e.g. -3: very difficult 
MOD 
10 
11 
16 
12 
8 
14 
13 
15 
11 
13 
17 
7 
12 
19 
9 
15 
19 
X 
13 
S2 
3.55 
PCS 
80 
71 
204 
153 
96 
116 
141 
175 
138 
156 
158 
40 
85 
141 
116 
183 
144 
X 
129.24 
s2 
43.62 
PERSIS 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.08 
.47 
.51 
.51 
1.14 
2.08 
2.16 
2.88 
4.28 
4.34 
4.55 
4.91 
5.35 
9.48 
X 
2.52 
s2 
2.64 
INT 
+1 
+3 
-1 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+2 
+3 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
+3 
CONDITION H.S. 
ENJ DIFF NERV MEAN 
+1 
+3 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+2 
-1 
+2 
+1 
-1 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
+3 
-1 
-3 
-1 
-1 
+1 
-2 
+1 
+2 
-1 
-2 
+1 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-2 
+2 
-2 
+3 
+1 
-2 
+2 
-1 
-2 
-2 
-1 
+2 
-3 
-3 
-1 
-1 
+2 
+2 
+2 
-1 
+1 
+3 
+2 
-2 
-1 
+1 
+1 
-3 
+1 
-2 
-1 
-3 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-3 
+2 
IMP USE GOOD SUPERIOR 
-2 
+3 
+1 
-2 
-1 
+1 
+1 
-3 
+1 
+2 
+1 
.+1 
-1 
-2 
+3 
-2 
+2 
+1 
+3 
+2 
+1 
-1 
+1 
+1 
+2 
-1 
-2 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
-3 
-2 
+2 
+1 
+3 
+1 
+3 
+1 
+3 
+2 
+2 
+1 
-2 
+1 
+1 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-1 
+2 
-1 
+3 
+1 
-1 
-1 
+2 
+1 
-1 
+1 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-2 
+1 
-2 
+2 
vO 
CONDITION H.N.S. 
MOD PCS PERSIS INT ENJ DIFF NERV MEAN 
15 145 .03 -2 +2 -1 +2 +2 
10 132 .52 +1 +1 +2 +3 +1 
9 144 .64 +2 +1 - 1 +2 +2 
6 100 3.68 -2 +2 -1 +3 +1 
10 119 4.00 +2 +2 +2 +3 +1 
13 132 4.20 +3 +3 +2 +2 +3 
9 87 4.59 -2 -1 -2 +1 -3 
10 111 4.80 +3 +2 +1 +3 +1 
13 105 4.99 +2 +2 - 1 -1 +2 
9 73 5.23 +2 - 1 - 1 - 1 +1 
12 131 5.60 +2 -2 +2 -1 +1 
10 104 6.48 +3 -3 -2 +2 -1 
8 86 7.29 +2 +2 -2 -1 +2 
9 77 9.58 +3 +3 -2 -1 +2 
16 132 9.94 +2 +2 - 1 +3 +2 +2 +2 +1 +1 
10 142 10.00 +2 +2 +1 +2 -1 -1 -1 +2 - 1 
7 93 10.00 +3 +2 -2 +2 -1 -2 +2 +3 +1 
10.35 112.53 5.39 
2 2 2 
S* S S 
2.67 24.09 3.24 
MP 
-1 
-2 
+1 
-2 
-1 
+2 
-3 
+2 
+1 
+1 
-2 
+1 
+1 
+2 
USE 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
- 1 
+2 
-3 
-2 
+2 
+2 
+2 
- 1 
+2 
+2 
GOOD 
+1 
-1 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+3 
+1 
-2 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+2 
+2 
SUPERIOR 
+1 
+1 
-1 
-1 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
+2 
+2 
-1 
+1 
+1 
+1 
CONDITION C.S. 
MOD PCS PERSIS INT 
16 
14 
12 
11 
5 
16 
12 
11 
5 
11 
15 
11 
10 
9 
9 
5 
9 
X 
10.65 
s2 
3.50 
182 
84 
97 
84 
76 
131 
137 
108 
59 
135 
136 
78 
133 
87 
99 
93 
107 
X 
107.41 
s2 
30.95 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.29 
1.93 
2.64 
2.72 
3.50 
3.53 
3.81 
4.48 
4.83 
5.96 
8.64 
8.97 
X 
3.02 
s2 
2.92 
+2 
-2 
+2 
-3 
+1 
+1 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+3 
+2 
+2 
+2 
+2 
ENJ DIFF NERV MEAN 
-1 
-2 
-2 
-3 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+2 
-2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+1 " 
+2 
+3 
-1 
-1 
+1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-1 
-2 
+3 
-3 
-1 
+2 
+2 
-1 
+3 
-3 
-1 
+2 
+1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
+2 
+2 
-2 
-1 
+2 
-1 
+2 
-1 
+1 
-1 
-2 
+2 
-2 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+3 
+3 
+2 
+2 
-1 
+1 
IMP USE GOOD SUPERIOR 
-1 
-2 
+1 
-2 
-1 
-2 
+1 
+1 
+1 
+1 
-2 
+3 
+1 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
-2 
-2 
+2 
-1 
+1 
+1 
+1 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+3 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-1 
-2 
+1 
-2 
+2 
-1 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+1 
+1 
+3 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+1 
+2 
+1 
-2 
+2 
-1 
+2 
-1 
+1 
+1 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+2 
+1 
-1 
+1 
-1 
-1 
00 
«n CONDITION C.N.S. 
MOD PCS PERSIS INT ENJ DIFF NERV MEAN IMP USE 
-1 +3 -3 -3 -3 
+1 +3 +3 +2 +2 
+2 +3 +2 +1 +1 
+2 +3 -2 -2 -2 
-2 +3 +2 +2 +3 
-1 +1 +2 +1 +1 
+3 +3 +3 +3 +3 
+1 +1 -3 -1 -2 
+2 +3 +1 +1 +1 
-1 +2 -1 +1 -2 
+3 -2 +3 +3 +3 
+2 +3 -1 rl -1 
-1 -1 +2 +3 +3 
-1 -2 +1 +1 +2 
-2 -1 +1 -1 +1 
-2 -1 -2 -2 -2 
+2 +2 +1 -1 +2 
12 
12 
8 
17 
17 
10 
9 
11 
9 
13 
3 
7 
15 
8 
10 
7 
12 
X 
10.59 
s2 
3.68 
113 
102 
96 
120 
105 
91 
138 
142 
117 
100 
77 
100 
123 
71 
140 
60 
98 
X 
105.47 
s2 
23.43 
0 
.20 
.76 
.94 
3.05 
3.22 
4.67 
4.99 
5.49 
6.17 
6.21 
8.05 
9.46 
9.54 
9.86 
9.87 
10.00 
X 
5.44 
s2 
3.64 
-2 
+2 
+2 
-2 
+1 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+1 
-2 
-1 
+3 
+2 
+2 
-1 
+3 
-1 
-2 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+2 
-3 
-2 
+2 
+2 
-2 
+1 
+3 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+2 
XX)D 
-1 
+3 
+2 
+1 
+2 
+1 
+3 
+1 
+2 
-1 
+3 
+1 
+2 
+1 
+1 
-2 
+3 
SUPERIOR 
-1 
+2 
+1 
+1 
+2 
+1 
+3 
-1 
-1 
+1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
-1 
-1 
-3 
+1 
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APPENDIX D 
Post Experimental Questioning Procedure 
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Post-Experimental Questioning 
Questions to Subject by Experimenter: 
"What do you think, this experiment was about?" 
"Do you think I might have been looking for something else in this 
experiment?" 
...(If so) What do you think that that might be?" 
Probing of Surveillance Subjects 
1. Camera surveillance 
"How did you feel about doing the task?" 
"What did you think of the television camera?" 
"Do you feel that it had an effect on your working on the task?" 
2. Human surveillance 
"How did you feel about doing the task?" 
"What did you think of me being present while you were doing the 
task?" 
"Do you feel that my presence had any effect on your working 
at the task?" 
Probing of Non-Surveillance Subjects 
1. Camera present, inoperative, 
"How did you feel about doing the task?" 
"What did you think of the television camera?" 
"How did you feel about being left alone to do the task?" 
2. Human surveillance not present 
"How did you feel about doing the task?" 
"How did you feel about being left alone to do the task?" 
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APPENDIX E 
Verbal Reports of Effect of 
Surveillance or Lack of Surveillance 
on Performance 
The following question was asked of subjects: 
"Do you feel: 
(for) human surveillance: my presence 
human non-surveillance: being left alone 
camera surveillance: the camera's presence 
camera non-surveillance: being left alone 
had any effect on your working the task?" 
The actual responses (see following page) were rated in the light 
of being positive, negative or neutral of subjective effect. 
Although the rating of the responses was essentially subjective, 
very close inter-judge agreement was obtained using the following 
key: 
positive! better, more, faster... 
negative: bothered, did less than could have, nervous.. 
neutral: no effect, not bothered, no thought... 
H.S. 
no effect 
thought more careful ly, 
wondered i f doing i t 
r i g h t 
felt nervous, more 
frustrated 
none 
none, didn't bother 
none, didn't really 
bother 
thought speed important 
quantity (went for) 
very nervous but time 
limit had more effect 
did more, didn't bother 
at all 
bothered 
nervous, affected most 
when built lousy models 
put more into it, at first 
bothered then not 
nervous, hurried faster 
did more, didn't really 
bother 
none, not really 
a little bothered 
not really 
Actual Responses 
H.N.S. 
none really 
better than if.. 
felt okay, better 
performance 
did well, better than if... 
felt okay, much better 
than if.. 
felt okay, probably more 
than if.. 
thought did better, complex' 
ity rather than quantity 
did more, felt better 
none, no effect 
better, did best could 
did better, more peaceful 
did better 
did better, felt better 
none, didn't bother 
didn't bother at all 
none 
probably did more, more 
relaxing 
C.S. 
none 
nervous, found task 
difficult 
no effect on per-
formance but nervous 
didn't really affect 
performance, wasn't 
bothered 
did more, felt 
being tested 
none, no effect 
no effect, didn't 
bother at all 
no effect, noticed 
but completely 
forgot it 
dampened frustrations, 
felt pressure of time 
not really, didn't 
bother 
not much effect 
C.N.S. 
no thought 
felt better, able to 
think clearer 
felt good, couldn't 
possibly finish all, 
took time 
better performance 
no effect, but didn't 
think did so well 
took my own time, 
didn't bother 
didn't bother, made 
complex models 
none 
didn't bother at all, 
went for quality 
none 
none 
bothered, not as fast 
as could 
faster 
not really bothered, 
none really 
none 
none, probably 
not bothered 
not really 
not bothered, but did 
less than could have 
none 
none, 
none 
none 
none 
not at all 
/ 
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APPENDIX F 
Verbal Debriefing and 
Written Feedback 
Debriefing 
What I am interested in finding out is simply whether the 
presence or absence of surveillance has an effect on your working at 
the task. Actually I am not particularly interested in how well you 
performed at the task, but rather whether or not you continued to work 
at the task after I left the room with your models. I have four groups 
of subjects, or four conditions rather, one in which I am present while 
a person works at the task, a second in which I am not present, a 
third in which there is a television camera present - which is 
incidentally a dummy camera - and a fourth in which there is a television 
camera present but not working and not pointed at the table. 
What I am looking for basically, is to find out whether 
persons persist less at the task after being subjected to surveillance 
than persons who were not under surveillance. That is, I am interest-
ed in whether or not you continued to use the tinker toys after I 
left the room with your models. 
How I was aware of whether you used them or not was by means 
of a (for T.V. surveillance condition: real) camera disguised up 
there (experimenter indicated camera) which is connected to a television 
in the next room. This camera only focuses on the work area of the 
table. I had to watch without you knowing or your natural reaction 
to continue or not would have been affected. After I left the room 
with your models, the time you spent out of exactly ten minutes was 
recorded. This persistence time will be recorded for all subjects, 
and the times for each condition will be compared to see whether 
surveillance really does affect persistence at a task. 
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Do you understand now what the experiment was about? (The 
experimenter answered any questions from the subject.) 
Okay, now to perhaps explain the why of this experiment. If 
surveillance does affect one's persistence at a task, this experiment 
could be of importance in areas such as schools, industry, prisons 
and perhaps hospitals. Simply, if you want a person to continue doing 
something, and perhaps be more interested in it, do not watch him 
while he is doing it. (The experimenter then expanded further by 
examples.) 
(Optional, if requested:) 
Now, you continued on with the task for out of ten minutes. 
(The experimenter then discussed the implications of the subject's 
persistence measure, emphasizing that it need not fit the expected 
paradigm.) 
Do you have any further questions? 
I can show you my other room with the television monitor if 
you wish to see it. (The experimenter then proceeded to do so. Once 
within the observation room, the experimenter briefly explained the 
procedure once again, then emphasized that the monitor transmitted 
no sounds, as well as focused only on the work table: hence providing 
subjects with some measure of privacy.) 
Okay, I'll have to ask you not to talk to anyone about this 
experiment until I have finished because it is important not to have 
anyone know anything about it if I am to get valid results. I will 
be mailing a copy of my final results to you when the experiment is 
completed. Thank you for taking part in this experiment. 
Feedback 
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Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5. Telephone (5/9) 8S4 1970 
Dear Student, 
Some time ago you participated in a study concerning "Effects 
of Surveillance on Intrinsic Motivation". As promised, the following 
are the overall results of the experiment. 
Measures taken were: Performance: number of models, number 
of pieces used; Persistence: time spent continuing with the material; 
Questionnaire items: interest, enjoyableness, difficulty and 
nervousness, and a "filler" question. 
Several statistical analyses were applied to the data from 
the four conditions which were: human surveillance ( experimenter 
present ), human non-surveillance ( experimenter absent ), camera 
surveillance ( television camera operative ), camera non-surveillance 
( camera present but inoperative, pointed away ). 
No significant differences were found between groups in 
terms of performance ( models or pieces ), nor any of the questionnaire 
ratings; however, persistence times differed with the non-surveillance 
groups persisting more ( almost twice as much ) than the surveillance 
groups. This was found significant at the .001 probability level, 
supporting the hypothesis that surveillance affects persistence at 
a task. 
A more detailed account of the experimental rationale and 
results will be available at some future date, through the Wilfrid 
Laurier University library. Thank you for participating. 
( M.A. candidate ) 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
